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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of criminal cases involving sexual abuse of children. The ex-
panding case load stems from a growing awareness within our soci-
ety of child molestation. With society's encouragement and
recognition of the problem, children are starting to speak out and
parents, social service agencies, teachers, health care professionals,
law enforcement personnel, and prosecutors are beginning to lis-
ten.1 Commentators differ as to the reasons for this new awareness,
but cannot deny that prosecutions initiated as a direct result of it
have had a significant impact on the criminal justice system in
Montana and throughout the nation.2
* County Attorney, Lewis and Clark County; B.S., University of Montana, 1970; J.D.,
Gonzaga University, 1975.
** Deputy County Attorney, Lewis and Clark County; B.S., Boston University, 1968;
M.Ed. Boston University, 1970; J.D., University of Montana, 1980.
1. Teachers, medical personnel, and other individuals having contact with children are
required to report suspected incidents of child abuse. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-201, -202
(1983); see also id. § 41-3-207, amended by 1985 Mont. Laws ch. 367.
2. There were 5,628 cases of child abuse and neglect referred to the Montana Depart-
ment of Social and Rehabilitation Services in 1984. Of these, 528 were cases in which sex
abuse was substantiated. Report of Community Services Division, Montana Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services (data compiled Jan. 29, 1985) [hereinafter cited as SRS
Report].
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The factor that makes child sexual abuse dramatically differ-
ent from other criminal cases is that the victims are children.
Often these victims are very young, even preschoolers.3 They find
it difficult to understand and to communicate their experiences.
When thrust into the criminal justice system, the trauma they ex-
perience often becomes even more severe.
The system must adapt to the special needs of these child vic-
tims. It is the purpose of this article to outline some of the availa-
ble techniques for prosecuting sexual abuse cases, to discuss some
deficiencies that are presently handicapping the system, and to
propose a partial solution that we feel should be incorporated into
the system. The use of videotape testimony, anatomically correct
dolls, and other procedures are instrumental in easing the child's
fears of the courtroom process. The skillful use of the rules of evi-
dence, particularly the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule,
are essential to a successful prosecution. In our view, however, the
admission of reliable hearsay statements of the child victims would
make the criminal justice system more responsive to the needs of
these children and yet avoid conflict with the constitutional rights
guaranteed every citizen charged with a criminal offense.
II. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS WITH CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS
A successful sexual abuse prosecution generally requires that
the child victim testify against the offender. Often in cases of this
nature, there is very little, if any, evidence to corroborate the
child's account of the offense, because of the secretive nature of
the crime itself. Most sex offenses therefore must be proved by the
testimony of the victim, corroborated, if the prosecutor is lucky, by
medical or laboratory evidence. Thus, the victim's testimony or
testimony regarding the victim's statements about the incident is
absolutely critical.4
Cases involving young victims often are complicated further
by delayed reporting of the offense. It is not unusual for a child to
keep the fact of the incident secret for weeks, or even months.
3. Of the 528 cases of substantiated sexual abuse reported to the Department of Social
and Rehabilitation Services, 26% of the victims were age five and younger. Fifty-six percent
were under the age of ten. Id.
4. Until recently, many states required corroboration of a victim's testimony, and con-
sequently many cases were not able to be prosecuted at all. Now, however, corroboration is
no longer required in most states. B. MoRAsco, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX
CRIMES § 2.05(2) (1984). Montana law provides that the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim, if believed, is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. A.D.M., - Mont. - ,
701 P.2d 999 (1985); State v. Metcalf, 153 Mont. 369, 457 P.2d 453 (1969); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-301 (1983).
[Vol. 46
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Typically, the offender has threatened the child with physical
harm and the threats are taken seriously. Moreover, children often
feel ashamed of their involvement and will not immediately tell
their parents or other adults what has happened to them. This is
especially true if the offender is a member of the child's
household.
One unfortunate consequence of the child's silence is that a
physician's examination is not conducted until long after the inci-
dent. Thus medical reports and the results of laboratory tests often
are not available to corroborate the statements of the victim.
Under these circumstances, the child's testimony or statement is
even more crucial.
The extremely young child victim presents other special
problems as a witness. The problems may arise either from dis-
qualification because of age or other infirmity or the child's refusal
to testify out of fear, shyness, or trauma. The latter is especially
problematic if the offender is a parent or a member of the victim's
household, as there is often subtle pressure placed on the child not
to testify.'
Since 1895, children have been allowed to testify in court pro-
ceedings provided certain minimum foundation qualifications are
established. Although many states fix an age above which a child
is presumed to be competent,8 the Montana Rules of Evidence pro-
vide that everyone is a competent witness unless disqualified.' A
child, or any other witness, however, will be disqualified if he is
incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be
understood by the judge and jury, or if he is incapable of under-
standing the duty to tell the truth.'0 The determination whether
the witness is competent to testify is made by the judge," outside
the presence of the jury.'2 The party seeking disqualification bears
the burden of proof.'3
Thus, in Montana, a factual determination must be made to
establish whether a child is qualified to testify. The child who is
5. L. Berliner, L. Blick, & J. Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of Intra-
Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
AND THE LAW 166 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Berliner].
6. Id.
7. Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895).
8. G. Melton, J. Bulkley, & D. Wulkman, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in
CHILD SExuAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 125 (4th ed. 1983).
9. MONT. R. EVID. 601; State v. Rogers, - Mont. -, 692 P.2d 2 (1984).
10. MONT. R. EVID. 601(b); State v. D.B.S., - Mont. -, 700 P.2d 630, 636 (1985).
11. State v. Smith, - Mont. -, 676 P.2d 185. (1984).
12. Id.
13. State v. Coleman, 177 Mont. 1, 579 P.2d 732 (1978).
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incapable of expressing himself concerning the offense so as to be
understood by a judge and jury may be disqualified, even if he can
appreciate the distinction between truth and fiction. This is often
the case in sexual offenses because children become confused by
the passage of time between the commission of the offense and the
trial. Shyness, fear of repercussions, or serious disruption within
the family after the child's allegations become known also can
make the testimonial experience very traumatic for the child
involved.""
Without the testimony of the child or the admission of the
child's statement, however, no prosecution can be consumated and
the offender will go free. It is incumbent upon the criminal justice
system to protect child victims and to prevent future injury to
other children. These victims should not be denied their legal re-
dress merely because they are of tender age. Fortunately, several
legal procedures are available to assist the prosecution of sexual
offenders.
III. PROSECUTORIAL METHODS
There are methods of approaching the prosecution of child
sexual abuse which ease the trauma to the victim and allow the
prosecution to introduce crucial evidence. Montana law allows the
prosecution to introduce the victim's testimony on videotape. Ad-
ditionally, numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule provide for the
admission of evidence which can add credence to the child's testi-
mony, or take the place of a child's direct testimony altogether.
Finally, the Montana Rules of Evidence provide for the admission
of a child's prior statements, which may be used to bolster the
child's testimony, if the child offers direct testimony in court.
A. Use of Videotaped Testimony
Since 1977, Montana law has permitted the videotaped testi-
14. In their article on the dynamics of sexual abuse within the family, Berliner, Blick,
and Bulkley note other problems, even if the child is qualified to testify:
[e]ven if the child is willing and competent to testify, the legal system's lack of
knowledge of children's developmental stages may lead to an erroneous decision
that the child is an incompetent witness . . . or, such lack of knowledge can result
in a failure to elicit the necessary information for successful legal action. Because
most police and prosecutors do not understand the various stages of a child's cog-
nitive or communicative ability, questions to the child may not be understood.
Thus, the child may either be unresponsive or unable to provide the correct or
desired answers.
Berliner, supra note 5, at 166.
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mony of a victim of a sexual offense to be presented at trial.1" The
court must admit the videotape, and the victim need not be pre-
sent in the courtroom when the evidence is introduced. 6 The use
of this type of taped testimony has limited application in the pros-
ecution of a sexual abuse case, however. The taping must be con-
ducted in front of the judge, the prosecuting attorney, the defen-
dant, and the defendant's attorney. 7 In order to preserve the
defendant's right of confrontation as guaranteed by the United
States and Montana Constitutions,1 8 the defendant's attorney is
entitled to cross examine the child witness. 9 Thus, while the child
witness may testify on videotape, he still must undergo cross ex-
amination by the defense attorney. Significantly, all of this must
be done in the defendant's presence, potentially making the proce-
dure extremely intimidating, particularly if the defendant is a fam-
ily member.20
B. Other Testimony Aids
There are other techniques which can make it easier for the
qualified child witness to testify. The child may testify while sit-
ting on the lap of a parent, a prosecutor, or a social worker.21 To
provide the jury with the explicit detail necessary to establish
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the child also may use anatomi-
cally correct dolls to explain the offense and how he was injured.22
California recently enacted legislation allowing a child victim
under the age of ten to testify by two-way closed circuit television.
If certain conditions are satisfied, the child is not required to tes-
tify in the physical presence of the judge, jury, defendant, or the
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1983) (enacted by 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 384).
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1983).
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-402(2) (1983).
18. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him"; similarly, in article II, § 24, the Montana Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses
against him face to face." See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Although the Montana Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the constitutionality of this procedure, other states have upheld it, so long as sixth
amendment rights have been preserved. State v. Hewett, 86 Wash. 2d 487, 545 P.2d 1201
(1976); State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (1982).
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-402(1) (1983).
20. In 1984, 40% of all the cases of sexual abuse substantiated by the Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services involved a parent or other member of the child's house-
hold. SRS Report, supra note 2.
21. State v. Rogers, - Mont. -, 692 P.2d 2 (1984).
22. See, e.g., D.B.S., - Mont. ., 700 P.2d 630; State v. Tuifree, 35 Wash. App.
243, 666 P.2d 912 (1983).
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defendant's attorney.23
None of these techniques, however, resolves the problem of
getting a child's testimony to the jury if he is disqualified or unable
to testify because of fear or excessive shyness. In those situations,
the child's statement of the offense will be excluded, unless the
court can be persuaded to admit it through one of the exceptions
to the rule precluding hearsay evidence.
C. Hearsay Exceptions
Numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule under the present
Montana Rules of Evidence are helpful in the successful prosecu-
tion of child sexual abuse. Spontaneous statements to another fol-
lowing an incident, statements of then-existing mental or physical
conditions, or statements to a physician taken for medical history
are allowed into evidence even though they are hearsay and the
witness is available to testify.2 4 Specifically, statements made by a
child victim describing the offense while perceiving it or made im-
mediately after to his mother or to another individual,25 or the
child's statements made while under the stress or excitement
caused by the offense2" are admissible. These statements are ad-
missible because they have particular guarantees of reliability and
trustworthiness that justify excepting them from the general rule
disallowing hearsay. Because these statements carry their own in-
dicia of reliability, the child victim need not testify at all. Yet
although these exceptions are helpful, they have limited applica-
tion in many cases involving young children.
One obstacle to these exceptions' more frequent use is the
Montana Supreme Court's ruling that the passage of time is an
important element when the exceptions are involved. Although it
has not stated a precise time requirement, the court has indicated
that the statements must be made at a time close to the commis-
sion of the offense.2 8 Courts in other jurisdictions have made simi-
lar rulings. With regard to the excited utterance exception, some
states have held that, if the delay can be explained, a lapse of one
to seven days between the statement and the offense is accept-
23. 1985 Cal. Stat. Ch. 43.
24. MoNer. R. EvID. 803(1)-(4).
25. MONT. R. EVID. 803(1).
26. MONT. R. EVID. 803(2).
27. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (daughter's prior testimony at the preliminary
hearing bore "sufficient reliability" that her absence at trial did not render father's testi-
mony impermissible); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE Ch. 29 (2d ed. 1972).
28. See, e.g., State v. Norgaard, - Mont. -, 653 P.2d 483, 488 (1982).
234 [Vol. 46
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able, 20 while other jurisdictions have limited the exception to in-
stances in which the child was noticeably upset or crying when
making the statement."0
Many incidents of sexual abuse are not reported until long af-
ter they have taken place. Because the trauma of the sexual abuse
may last far longer than several hours or several days, a stringent
rule concerning the passage of time may prevent the use of what
should qualify as an excited utterance. Indeed, many courts have
recognized that, in dealing with children, the time element should
not be construed strictly,3" but rather the source of the stress and
the age and capacity of the child under stress should be considered
in determining what constitutes sufficient excitement.3 2 It is the
reliability of the statement that forms the basis for the exception,
not nearness in time, and the indicia of reliability of course vary
when young children are involved. Despite this recognition, how-
ever, most courts continue to consider statements to be excited ut-
terances only within a limited time frame.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment are admissible into evidence and can be of significant assis-
tance in the prosecution of child abuse cases.33 Medical evidence is
not always probative in these cases, however. Unless the incident is
reported shortly after it occurs and the child examined immedi-
29. People v. Dickinson, 2 Mich. App. 646, 141 N.W.2d 360 (1966) (one day); State v.
Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (1982) (three days); State v. Lovett, 85 Mich. App.
534, 272 N.W.2d 126 (1978) (seven days).
30. State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Iowa 1983) (citing State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d
192, 196 (Iowa 1981)).
31. The Colorado court pointed out the differences in dealing with a child's "excited
utterance" in People in Interest of O.E.P., - Colo. - , 654 P.2d 312, 318 (1982),
stating:
Although the temporal interval between the "startling event" and the child's
statement is not without significance, it is not conclusive on the question of ad-
missibility. The element of trustworthiness underscoring the excited utterance ex-
ception, particularly in the case of young children, finds its source primarily in
"the lack of capacity to fabricate rather than the lack of time to fabricate."
32. In Dickinson, 2 Mich. App. 646, 652, 141 N.W.2d 360, 363, the Michigan court
determined that a spontaneous statement was admissible despite a lapse of time, if the de-
lay is explained. In Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 453, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (1980), the
Colorado court noted that the latitude in temporal proximity allowed by courts in cases
involving children recognizes that young children are not adept at reasoned reflection and
concoction of false stories in stressful situations. Similarly in Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 419,
329 N.W.2d 263, 266, the Wisconsin court noted that in dealing with child witnesses, courts
have given a broad interpretation to what constitutes an excited utterance. Stress may con-
tinue for a longer time, in that: (1) children are apt to repress this type of incident, (2)
children will be unlikely to report this kind of incident to anyone but the mother, and (3)
children's declarations are "free of conscious fabrication" for a longer period of time than
are adults.
33. MoNT. R. EvID. 803(4).
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ately, or unless physical injury is involved, there is little evidence
other than medical history that a physician can provide. Many ju-
risdictions, including Montana, admit victims' statements through
this exception. 4 The question that has not been specifically an-
swered in Montana, though, is whether the child's identification of
the defendant to a physician is admissible, because such identifica-
tion is not specifically required for the medical history.5 Without
other evidence specifically identifying the offender, the child still
would have to be called as a witness to make the identification.
Finally, under the existing Montana Rules of Evidence, two
catchall provisions allow the admission of hearsay statements not
enumerated in the Rules' specific exceptions but which have com-
parable guarantees of trustworthiness.3" At least one court has re-
lied on a catchall provision identical to Rule 804(b)(5) of the Mon-
tana rules as the basis for admitting a six year old's "sleep talk" to
corroborate the child's direct testimony concerning abuse.3 7 Con-
cluding that a young child is not likely to fake a bad dream, the
court determined that the hearsay was sufficiently trustworthy to
fall within this exception. 8 There is very little case law defining
the use of these two catchall exeptions, however, leaving their suc-
cessful use to a case-by-case basis. With such uncertainty sur-
rounding the admissibility of a child's statement through these rec-
ognized catchall exceptions, a prosecutor would be ill-advised to
ground a case on one of them.
All of the above hearsay statements are admissible, even
though in reality they deny the defendant his right to confront the
witness against him. A child witness need not be present in the
courtroom if his statement can be admitted through one of the ex-
ceptions. Yet in many cases a child victim's out-of-court statement
does not fit into one of these recognized exceptions.
If the child does testify, certain hearsay exclusions permit the
child's previous out-of-court statement to be admitted if it is a
34. See, e.g., United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979); Dickinson, 2 Mich.
App. 646, 141 N.W.2d 360; Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983).
35. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980) (statements concerning
identity of perpetrator not sufficiently related to treatment); State v. Fleming, 27 Wash.
App. 952, 621 P.2d 779 (1981) (physician can testify to cause of injury, but not to fault);
Goldade, 674 P.2d 721 (identification of perpetrator allowed because of court's concern over
child abuse).
36. MoNT. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). The two rules differ only in that Rule 803
exceptions can be used when the out-of-court declarant is available but does not testify,
while Rule 804 exceptions require the unavailability of the out-of-court declarant.
37. State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn. 1981).
38. Absent additional evidence of the sexual abuse, the hearsay testimony would not
have sustained a conviction. Id. at 641.
236 [Vol. 46
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prior consistent or prior inconsistent statement.3 9 Prior consistent
statements may be introduced if the statements are consistent with
in-court testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of subsequent
fabrication, improper influence, or motive. 40 The Montana Su-
preme Court has recognized the use of these statements in sexual
assault cases, as have other jurisdictions. 4' The Montana rule does
not specify, however, and the court has not addressed whether the
prior consistent statement also can be used to rehabilitate a forget-
ful witness or one who lacks the ability to easily express himself.
Other jurisdictions with the same rule seem to allow this use of
prior consistent statements.4"
Previously made inconsistent statements can be used simi-
larly, but again, only if the declarant testifies at trial.'3 For exam-
ple, if while testifying in court a young child denies having been
molested, 4 earlier statements describing the incident may be in-
troduced.' 5 These prior inconsistent statements, as well as prior
consistent statements, may be considered as substantive evi-
dence,4" although a conviction cannot be grounded solely on a prior
inconsistent statement.'7
Thus, if the child does testify, many procedural devices are
available to the prosecution to help establish the guilt of the of-
fender. Serious impediments to prosecution arise, however, when
the child is unable or unwilling to be a witness.
39. MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
40. MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
41. State v. Mackie, - Mont. - , 622 P.2d 673 (1981); State v. Middleton, 294 Or.
427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
42. State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 661 P.2d 1105 (1983); State v. Messamore, 639 P.2d
413 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1982).
43. MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
44. In the discussion of the dynamics of sexual abuse within the family, Berliner,
Blick, and Bulkley note some of the reasons why a child may change his story:
The family often pressures the child to retract the story, by, for example, telling
her she will split up the family, send her father to jail, and cause her mother to
lose financial support. The legal process can also exacerbate the situation and con-
tribute to a child's retraction or refusal to testify. Moreover, the child may have
ambivalent feelings toward the abusive parent, which might lead to his or her
changing the story initially given at a later date or at trial.
Berliner, supra note 5, at 172.
45. If a child does change his story or denies the incident on the witness stand, the
prosecutor's rebuttal can present expert testimony to explain the family dynamics that
could cause the inconsistent testimony. Id.
46. State v. Fitzpatrick, 186 Mont. 187, 198, 606 P.2d 1343, 1349 (1980).
47. State v. White Water, - Mont. - , 634 P.2d 636, 638 (1981).
1985]
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IV. A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION IS WARRANTED
Victims of sexual abuse are often children of very young age.
These children may not report that they have been molested until
days, weeks, or even months have passed from the time the offense
occurred. Frequently, the offender is a member of the child's own
household or may have threatened the child with serious harm if
the offense is reported. For these reasons, it is often impossible for
a child to testify on direct examination in a criminal proceeding.
Sexually abused children have a right to be heard, however, and to
legal redress. There are two possible responses to this need. The
Montana courts could make use of the exceptions provided in
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Montana Rules of Evidence,
which allow the use of reliable hearsay testimony. Alternatively,
other states recently have adopted, through legislation, an addi-
tional exception to the hearsay rule specifically addressing child
sexual abuse." Both of these options can put crucial evidence
before the judge or jury, while recognizing the problems related to
young victim witnesses.
In order to accommodate the child witness, the courts and the
legislature must resolve the conflict between two competing inter-
ests: the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him
and the need to provide protection for the child victim within the
criminal justice system. The use of any hearsay statement allows a
technical violation of the confrontation clause. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, long has recognized that in certain cases hearsay
statements can be used without offending the defendant's confron-
tation rights.49 If admissibility is not grounded on one of the recog-
nized exceptions to the hearsay rule,50 the evidence may be admit-
ted only upon a showing of unavailability of the witnesses and
then, only if the statement contains adequate guarantees of trust-
worthiness and reliability. 1 Additionally, there must be a demon-
48. Such legislation was introduced in the 49th Montana Legislative Session early this
year. House Bill 69 passed second reading in the House of Representatives on a vote of 52-
48 but was killed on the third reading, 51-48.
49. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Roberts, 448 U.S. 56; Dutton v. Ev-
ans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (availability of cross examination is not the sole criterion by which
to test admissibility of hearsay over confrontation clause).
50. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
51. The Court outlined its approach in Roberts:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of
admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-
to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the
usual case. . . the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavaila-
bility of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Re-
238 [Vol. 46
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strated need for the evidence.52
Clearly, there is a demonstrated need for the use of a young
child's out-of-court statement in sexual abuse cases. Frequently
the child is unavailable as a witness and there is often little, if any,
evidence other than the child's out-of-court statement. This need
for the child victim's out-of-court statements and the availability
of means to test the statements' reliability would allow the Mon-
tana court to rely on Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to fashion5 3 an
exception to the hearsay rule which protects the child witness and
yet does not offend the defendant's state and federal constitutional
rights. In fact, the rules themselves contemplate the use of these
exceptions when necessary to expand the law of evidence in the
area of hearsay:
The preceding 23 exceptions of Rule 803 and the first five excep-
tions of Rule 804(b), are designed to take full advantage of the
accumulated wisdom and experience of the past in dealing with
hearsay. It would, however, be presumptuous to assume that all
possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been cata-
logued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a
closed system. Exception (24) and its companion provision in
Rule 804(b)(6) are accordingly included. They do not contemplate
an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide
for treating new and presently unanticipated situations which
demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically
stated exceptions. Within this framework, room is left for growth
and development of the law of evidence in the hearsay area, con-
sistently with the broad purpose expressed in Rule 102."
While there is little case law in Montana defining the parame-
ters of these rules, 5 Justice Harrison has indicated in Jacques v.
National Guard56 that the Montana court can and should rely on
these exceptions in cases in which the hearsay evidence sought to
flecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by
ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the clause
countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that "there is no
material departure from the reason of the general rule."
448 U.S. at 65 (citations omitted).
52. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199.
53. In its comments to MoNT. R. EVID. 803(24), the Commission stated: "There is no
equivalent Montana law to this exception. The adoption of this exception changes existing
Montana law to the extent that it allows a court to admit hearsay because an equivalent
guarantee of trustworthiness exists even though there is no specific exception allowing it."
54. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 320
(1973) (emphasis added).
55. Norgaard, - Mont. - , 653 P.2d 483; Jacques v. Montana Nat'l Guard, -
Mont. -, 649 P.2d 1319, 1327 (1982) (Harrison, J., dissenting).
56. - Mont. - , 649 P.2d 1319 (1982).
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be admitted is essential, material, and reliable.57 Reviewing the
Montana version of the rule, Justice Harrison concluded that the
drafters intended a rule even broader than the federal rule,
58
thereby allowing the Montana court to provide more liberal hear-
say exceptions.59
To insure reliability and trustworthiness of the statements to
be admitted under this exception, the court can test the child's
statement by the means used to test the trustworthiness of any
hearsay evidence, that is, by looking at the circumstances in which
the statement was made, to whom it was made, when it was made,
and whether the witness had any reason to lie.60 Additionally, our
experience and the literature support the proposition that chil-
dren's statements about sexual matters are inherently reliable be-
cause very young children without actual sexual experience are un-
able to lie or fantasize about sexual experiences, especially in the
explicit detail in which they often describe what has happened to
them.61 Expert testimony, of course, can be admitted on these
points to support the claim of reliability.62
When the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Rule 804(b)(5)
to allow the admission of a child's "sleep talk," it found that evi-
dence from a child is trustworthy.63 Other courts considering state-
57. Id. at -, 649 P.2d at 1330.
58. The Montana version does not contain the requirements for admissibility that are
set out in the federal rules. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5) require the court to deter-
mine that:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pur-
poses of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence.
59. Jacques, - Mont. at - , 649 P.2d at 1330.
60. United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978).
61. In his article on corroboration of victim testimony, David Lloyd points to a child's
inability to fantasize about sexual matters:
[Flantasies are based on [children's] daily experiences, and [are] used as tools in
the development of cognitive social skills and morality. Since knowledge through
observations or hearing is the basis for fantasy, children are unlikely to fantasize
about sexual activity using adult terms because sexual matters are generally not
discussed between parents and their children in an informative way. The child
who can describe an adult's erect penis and ejaculation has had direct experience
with them.
D. Lloyd, The Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in SEXUAL ABUSE AND
THE LAW 103, 105 (4th ed. 1983). See also People in the Interest of W.C.L., - Colo. App.
- 650 P.2d 1302 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, _ Colo. __ , 685 P.2d 176 (1984).
62. See, e.g., Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, 1218-20.
63. In considering this evidence, the Minnesota court noted, "It may be that generally
evidence of this sort would be untrustworthy. Here, however, we are not dealing with a
conniving person who was out to get someone by faking a bad dream, but a child who had
[Vol. 46
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ments sought to be admitted under Rules 803(24) or 804(b)(5)
have set forth specific criteria by which the hearsay is to be
evaluated:
The circumstances under which the statement was made must in-
dicate a very high degree of reliability and trustworthiness; the
statement must be offered as evidence of a material fact; the
statement, although not essential for proof of the point for which
it is offered, must be "more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts;" and the interest of justice will be
best served by admission of the statement into evidence.6 4
These cases present a workable means by which a trial court could
admit reliable statements while preserving the defendant's right of
confrontation. The trial court could evaluate the child's statement
prior to trial, using the above criteria, to determine the statement's
reliability. If the statement was found to be reliable, the case could
proceed without the child appearing as a witness.
Washington and Kansas, by legislation, have adopted a similar
exception to the hearsay rule that allows hearsay statements made
by the victims of child abuse to be admitted in trial, even though
the child does not testify. Both statutes recently were upheld by
their respective supreme courts, 6 and both essentially reflect a
codification of each state's case law surrounding Rule 803(24) and
Rule 804(b)(5).
The Washington statute permits an out-of-court statement by
a child under the age of ten to be admitted, if after a hearing con-
ducted outside the presence of the jury, the court finds that the
circumstances surrounding the statement provide sufficient indicia
of reliability, and the child either testifies or is unavailable. If the
child is unavailable as a witness, the statement may be admitted
only if there is corroborative evidence of the act.67
obviously suffered." Posten, 302 N.W.2d at 641.
64. Nick, 604 F.2d at 1203. There the court concluded that the child's statement was
an "excited utterance," but used the criteria for 803(24) admissibility to determine whether
there was a sixth amendment violation. See also Brown, 341 N.W.2d at 14-15, for a similar
analysis of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1985).
66. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984); State v. Pendelton, 10 Kan.
App. 2d 26, 690 P.2d 959 (1984).
67. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1985) provides:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissi-
ble by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in
the courts of the State of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
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The Kansas statute is very similar. It also allows out-of-court
statements made by a child victim, if, following a hearing, the child
is disqualified or is unavailable as a witness and his statement is
apparently reliable and trustworthy. The jury is to determine the
weight and credit to be given the statement, considering the age
and maturity of the witness and the circumstances under which
the statement was made. The Kansas statute does not require
corroboration. 8
The Kansas Supreme Court, in State v. Pendelton,9 upheld
the constitutionality of the statutory hearsay exception and al-
lowed the mother of a seven year old boy to testify concerning her
son's allegation to her of sexual solicitation by the defendant. The
victim had been disqualified as a witness because he was unable to
relate the facts of the offense in a logical progression. Nevertheless,
the victim's out-of-court statement was allowed, because it was
made under circumstances from which a strong inference of relia-
bility could be drawn: the child had, at his first opportunity, initi-
ated a conversation with his mother in which he related the facts
of the offense to her. Additionally, the mother had not made any
threats or promises to elicit the statement from her son.70
The Washington statute, in State v. Ryan,71 similarly survived
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indi-
cia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is unavailable
as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evi-
dence of the act.
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983) provides:
In a criminal proceeding or in a proceeding to determine if a child is a deprived
child under the Kansas juvenile code or a child in need of care under the Kansas
code for care of children, a statement made by a child, to prove the crime or that
the child is a deprived child or a child in need of care, if:
(1) The child is alleged to be a victim of the crime, a deprived child or a child
in need of care; and
(2) the trial judge finds, after a hearing on the matter, that the child is dis-
qualified or unavailable as a witness, the statement is apparently reliable and the
child was not induced to make the statement falsely by use of threats or promises.
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to a jury, the
trial judge shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight
and credit to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it
shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made, any possible threats or
promises that might have been made to the child to obtain the statement and any
other relevant factor.
69. 10 Kan. App. 2d 26, 690 P.2d 959 (1984).
70. Id. at __, 690 P.2d at 962-63.
71. 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
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a confrontation clause claim, although the Washington Supreme
Court held that the application of the statute was in violation of
the defendant's sixth amendment right and the case was reversed.
The court held that the mere fact of a child's youth did not render
the child incompetent and under the terms of the statute an indi-
vidual determination of competency had to be made in each case. 72
In addition, a specific showing of unavailability had to be made.73
Neither determination was made in Ryan, leading to the case's re-
versal. The Washington court, however, specifically upheld the
statute's constitutionality under both the federal and state
constitutions.74
Thus, at least two state legislatures have recognized the need
for increased flexibility in the hearsay rule when young children
have been victimized, and the constitutionality of these laws has
been upheld. Montana would be well advised to follow these states'
lead.
V. CONCLUSION
The developing awareness of the broad scope of child sexual
abuse has led to increased social pressure to do something to stop
it. Offenders must be prosecuted and treated. Unfortunately, all
too often the offender cannot be prosecuted because the principal
witness, the child victim, is unable to testify under current rules of
evidence.
The present rules of evidence were not developed with a full
recognition of the problems presented when it is necessary for very
young children to testify. Fortunately, the law is flexible and can
be adapted to the needs of our changing society. We long have ac-
cepted the doctrine that all hearsay does not necessarily offend
constitutional guarantees of confrontation. When out-of-court
statements bear sufficient trappings of reliability and trustworthi-
ness, they should be presented to the jury. The jury then has the
task of assigning the proper weight and credibility to the state-
ments. It is now time that the criminal justice system recognize the
problems of child sexual abuse victims. The reliable hearsay state-
ments of these children should be admitted into evidence. To do
less is to turn our backs on one of the most pressing social
problems of our day.
72. Id. at 691 P.2d at 203.
73. Id. at __, 691 P.2d at 202-03.
74. Id. at -, 691 P.2d at 202, 207.
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